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Abstract
During the past five years, the European Union has been trying to sponsor a coming of age of European
Identity awareness across national borders. In doing so, EU administration intends to square the circle of
European Union as the super nation-state of the nation states of Europe. However prompted or justified by the
political or economic context, it is noteworthy to what extent the texts of European statutes and policies lack
theoretical alternatives to the territorial and relatively homogeneous state. In order for it not to become a
threat perceived by the population in identity terms, the apparently forthcoming idea of European citizenship
needs to address the concerns of both traditional and new ethnonational minorities at the state level and
underneath. In the light of a global context, the tide of Europeanization is but a particular case of the
worldwide extended tension between the two increasing and opposing processes of globalization and
particularization. Drawing on methodological and theoretical considerations I explore the conflictive and
tangled hierarchies of identity and citizenship. Finally, in regard to the problem of how diverse cultures and
identities could relate to the universal idea of democratic citizenship, a proposal that attempts to mediate
multiculturalism and Eurocentrism will be drafted.
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During the past five years, the European Union has been trying to sponsor a coming of age of 
European Identity awareness across national borders. In doing so, EU administration intends to 
square the circle of European Union as the super nation-state of the nation states of Europe. 
However prompted or justified by the political or economic context, it is noteworthy to what 
extent the texts of European statutes and policies lack theoretical alternatives to the territorial and 
relatively homogeneous state. In order for it not to become a threat perceived by the population 
in identity terms, the apparently forthcoming idea of European citizenship needs to address the 
concerns of both traditional and new ethnonational minorities at the state level and underneath. 
In the light of a global context, the tide of Europeanization is but a particular case of the 
worldwide extended tension between the two increasing and opposing processes of globalization 
and particularization. Drawing on methodological and theoretical considerations I explore the 
conflictive and tangled hierarchies of identity and citizenship. Finally, in regard to the problem 
of how diverse cultures and identities could relate to the universal idea of democratic citizenship, 
a proposal that attempts to mediate multiculturalism and Eurocentrism will be drafted. 
Introduction 
The question of methodology is rarely raised within the field of citizenship studies. Citizenship 
seems a well-defined concept. Its technical and colloquial meaning coincide. As many empirical 
projects focus on specific aspects of citizenship in particular regions, outlining the scope of the 
project seems the only necessary methodological distinction. When doing qualitative research, 
however, we discover that clear words (such as citizenship and identity) in reality comprise a 
complex network of behavior, emotions and history. Such and such person is Spanish, a Turkish 
immigrant in Germany, a French Basque, etc. But soon enough we discover that the limits and 
relations between these concepts are not so easy to draw, just as the reality they try to account for 
is more subtle than what the labels indicate. We decide that next time we will not ask what 
nationality you are but rather, for instance: 1) whether you would relocate to another European 
country if you were offered a position; 2) what is your opinion about the right to vote and be 
elected in local elections, that has been granted to citizens of a European Union member state 
while residing in the territory of any other member state. 
Another example may be useful. An American graduate student could set out to study how 
Spanish citizenship (of Spain, that is) relates to European citizenship. Her first discovery would 
be that while there is nothing wrong with the word citizenship in any case, and all participants 
talk about it and understand one another, the underlying realities have little in common. 
Moreover, Spanish citizenship encompasses uneven (and unequal) degrees of decentralization 
that correspond with historical and territorial cultures and administrative units. Simultaneously, 
some of these units contain different forms of national citizenship, regional citizenship and even 
separatism. The researcher might be surprised to discover that Spanish citizenship is not 
experienced by Spaniards in the same way that Americans experience American citizenship. The 
less prior reflection upon the idea of citizenship, the bigger the surprise. All too often, if there is 
no such theoretical/methodological reflection preceding research we will arrive at conclusions 
that simply mirror our premises. Reflecting on our own methodological principles allows us to 
follow a via media between the deceptive appearance of clear concepts (which seems to point to 
reality too quickly) and the endless deconstruction of terminology (which postpones indefinitely 
the exit from the text). 
The aim of this paper is also to open a methodological and conceptual reflection -- a goal which 
originated in my ongoing research on cultural citizenship and the creation of European identity 
(Delgado, 1997). In that study, I compared two ways of linking culture and citizenship -- the 
concept of cultural citizenship, based on an anthropological study of Latino communities in the 
United States, and the proposal of European identity made by the European Union 
Administration during the past five years. For the American side of the comparison, I relied on 
fieldwork done by other anthropologists at Stanford (Rosaldo, 1994). To study the official 
project of European identity I analyzed databases of European law, court cases and other sources 
of news and reports. My interest in this project came while I was in the field, mostly conducting 
interviews and participating in meetings, during a year-long research project on the impact of the 
Uruguay Round regulations of the GATT on Spain and European Union policies (Delgado, 
Feito, Landa, Castillo, & Delicado, 1995). 
With regard to the European politics of citizenship, I have looked in vain for a theoretical 
discussion on the relationship between politico-economic levels and forms of identity and culture 
involved. European Union studies are constantly faced with this interplay by means of the 
intercommunication between local and global, particular and national. The levels involved make 
up intricate hierarchies, and I am persuaded that we ought to study such interaction throughout 
the European Union. Traditionally, studying such an institutional crossroads required the 
exhaustive analysis of one aspect of a particular institution. To attain this goal the institution had 
to be untangled and stripped of its context. Yet time and again we realize that the most diverse 
EU research topics require a multilevel and interdisciplinary approach. Be it concerned with 
environmental policies or minorities, a single-level approach seems to leave out far more than it 
encompasses. Still, there is little explicit discussion of this methodological difficulty and how we 
should go about investigating it. I suggest that the complex crossing of scales be made the center 
of attention instead of the first empirical obstacle. In lieu of scales or levels, I call the 
phenomenon "tangled hierarchies", borrowing the concept/term from Hofstadter (1979). Where a 
multilevel analysis of one dimension is usually conducted (e.g. multilevel democracy, multilevel 
defense policy) I propose a one-dimensional spotlight on the web of political and cultural 
dimensions involved in European citizenship. The ability to deal with such labyrinths is precisely 
a strength of qualitative methodology. 
In what follows, I attempt to show that if we look closely enough, those concepts of citizenship 
and identity that (when confronted with the field) we saw break into pieces were already in a 
problematic relationship of their own. And if we learn from our research experience that we can 
draw certain empirical distinctions at the conceptual level, then instead of discovering 
"entanglement of concepts" we shall be better equipped to understand the empirical 
entanglement of hierarchies, actors' strategies and the project of European citizenship. It is 
important to underscore that the following theoretical distinctions are empirical. If the 
anthropologists know by experience that a number of sources of solidarity (religion, kinship, 
political organization) coexist in any given society with different degrees of intensity and a 
constant tension between order and disorder, why should we confront European identity and 
citizenship as if they were the unproblematic, most inclusive set of concentric circles of 
belonging (e.g. feeling Scottish, then British, then European)? 
An interdisciplinary approach is key to this endeavor. If "culture" is what anthropologists write 
about and "politics" the domain of political science, then no one can make sense of most issues 
in Europe or elsewhere. The political is cultural and vice versa. In this context, polls and focus 
groups are useful to test ideas. Secondary data analysis, statistics and program evaluation are 
necessary to reject bad policies. Yet conceptual analysis and first-hand qualitative knowledge 
obtained through ethnographic research also prove invaluable to achieve a better understanding 
of the multilevel and dynamic balance that individuals, groups and nations keep. Ethnographic 
research can also help raise issues, outline new policies, settle conflicts, etc., since it allows the 
entry of rich data into the policy-making debate. 
Interdisciplinary complexity on the conceptual level and a multilevel qualitative approach are 
necessary to prevent social scientists from discovering ideas, at the end of empirical research, 
that were long held as basic tenets of a neighboring field. For the researcher of transnationalism 
in Europe, such is often the case regarding the administration of citizenship by the state: why 
keep groups of people separated by an arbitrary classification and a few rights when they are 
living together and function as equal citizens? Here, political scientists know better. On the other 
hand, these political scientists may inquire: what should a Dane be afraid of when it comes to a 
very limited idea of European Union citizenship, such as the one that was introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty of the European Union? Now it is the cultural anthropologists' turn not to be 
surprised. There are many things anthropologists and political scientists can learn from each 
other to better understand political memberships and nationalities. The present theoretical 
discussion is one step toward that end. I shall come back to the implications of this in section III , 
where I intend to elaborate further on the advantages of applying qualitative methods to the study 
of European identity politics. 
This paper reflects upon the relations between cultural identity and citizenship in the context of 
current processes of globalization and particularization. According to scholars such as Robertson 
(1992) and Giddens (1994), we witness two opposing yet complementary1 processes: an ever 
increasing globalization of economy, politics and culture, and on the other hand a revival of 
particularization such as nationalisms, regionalisms, etc. Nation states are caught in between 
these two processes. They still represent the main political institution and are tied to the 
administration of citizenship -- yet they find themselves notably overshadowed by global 
economy, transnational movements that intend to protect human rights and environment, and the 
rise in the internal politics of difference. I consider both dynamics -- globalization and 
particularization -- as involving social conflict, via their challenging the unity and stability of 
large states or economic and political alliances such as the European Union. In regard to the 
domestic side, i.e. to the consequences in the long run of increasing politics of difference in a 
state which is simultaneously engaged in global dynamics, I propose that governments should 
respond by remaining within the project of a plural and social citizenship, but without embarking 
in any proposal of oxymoronic cultural citizenship, such as launching the identity of political 
unions overriding those of the members, or encouraging multiculturalism. Oxymorons and other 
forms of cultural creativity are to be left to the citizens themselves in a broad and fair democratic 
framework. 
I suggest we keep in mind the construction of the European Union as a reference case. One of the 
issues at stake is how to build a political union and a concept of European citizenship that hold 
the pieces together without threatening them with homogenization, loss of sovereignty or lack of 
democratic federal institutions. Thus far one could say that every reaction against the Union 
takes the banner of defending the identity of a collective, supposedly threatened by the advances 
of the Union -- a group of peasants of Mediterranean Spain, fishermen of Basque country, the 
French telecommunications industry or such countries as Denmark in regard to European 
citizenship. The European Union has to address both the growing claims of human rights and 
cultural diversity, in which it encounters national, ethno-national minorities (traditional, within 
the borders of old nations, that is), and new ethnic or national minorities (as a result of XXth 
century immigration). 
A list of the facets of the situation could be outlined as follows. First of all, there is the body of 
universal rights of personhood, which obviously transcends the European Union. So far, there is 
(almost) no perceived identity of any kind in being European. If it where otherwise, its launching 
and sponsoring wouldn't be necessary. In Dahrendorf's terms (1994), there exists a network of 
economic policies that guarantees supplies or provisions. There are some statutes in Maastricht 
Treaty that regulate certain rights for the European citizen, yet there is no actual body of 
European citizenship and social entitlements. There are old nation-states, endowed with 
citizenship and nationality. But there are also nationalisms that never made states, enjoying 
different degrees of autonomy or self-regulation depending on the present state's internal 
administration. Finally, the immigration waves of the past decades have brought into the picture 
more non-Western religious and ethnic diversity. From the point of view of the administration of 
the European Union, one cannot even think that the body of human rights does not interfere with 
the design and practice of European citizenship, for there are already many examples in which 
aliens in the EU have resorted to this body to justify claims that had not been included in their 
entitlements as citizens of both the Union and their host countries. Far from the intended model 
of concentric circles of belonging, the idea of European citizenship and identity creates de facto a 
haven of 'tangled hierarchies', similar to those drawn by M. C. Escher and theorized by Douglas 
Hofstadter (1979). In such a network of relations A, for example, can be regarded as larger than 
B, B larger than C which in turn, surprise! is larger than A. In our case, A can be a country 
member of the EU with an statute that develops a law of B, the Union itself, which complies with 
C, the rights of personhood; and notwhitstanding this hierarchy the statute of A is found against 
C (Human rights) in the tribunal of justice of the European Union (B). 
I believe that any of the phenomena under the words cultural identity, citizenship and 
personhood, if given substantial preference as a political principle over the rest, immediately 
leads to a conflict between institutions. Naive as it might sound, I shall support the thesis that 
dividing lines between those concepts/practices should be drawn. First, I shall present my 
description of what I consider the terms of the problem in three stages -- I.1 relations between 
citizenship and cultural identity at the conceptual level in social studies, I.2 future of the idea of 
citizenship, I.3 lack of practical relations between citizenship and cultural identities. Last, I shall 
justify my proposal in three paragraphs, which intend to follow the order of the previous 
exposition of the problem. 
I 
I.1. In a highly interdependent world, social and cultural identities are being defined internally, 
in lieu of the former taxonomic accounts made by external observers. Cultural identity is an 
historical constancy or continuity which is traced and narrated by individuals as stemming from 
and consisting of a variety of phenomena. Within the social sciences, attaching the plural form 
'identities' to the definition of social and cultural, means that I do not focus on the psychological 
aspects of identity, nor do I study identity in kinship relations or other face-to-face groups. 
Instead, I choose an approach closer to the old sociological problematique of 'mechanic 
solidarity', which is how people are held together today, when they are usually not in or cannot 
even resort to face-to-face Gemeinschaft-like organic-solidarity relationships. 
For example, nationality is a producer of cultural identity. So is ethnicity. I believe that 
citizenship belongs in this group too. Being an ecologist, a feminist or a member of the gay and 
lesbian community are other cases of bearing a certain cultural identity. 
All cultural identities share a set of characteristics and functions2 -- they provide personal 
identity, are ethical communities, build historical constancy, are made up by belief, tend to mark 
a territory, have practical purposes, are thought by their members as conferring marks that 
differentiate them from the others, enable patterns of behavior, beliefs and a shared language, 
and have a public presence. An individual can combine3 a number of these identities, though it's 
typical of cultural identities to claim monopoly of their members' behavior and thinking in 
certain domains of action at every moment, or even in all domains all the time. 
Cultural identities are local phenomena. They arise in a particular place at a given moment and 
are truly historic artefacts. The universal part of the concept of cultural identities is that they are 
conceived of by the social sciences as universal -- every human society needs a number of 
institutions that confer identity and produce solidarity. 
Although cultural identities and institutions are connected in a creative circular manner, it is 
worth emphasizing that whereas all cultural identities come from institutions or are institutions in 
themselves (or react against institutions), there are institutions that do not confer identity, or to 
be more precise, that do not comply with all the attributes of cultural identities. Nationality is an 
institution that produces and conveys cultural identity. Conversely, courtesy is another 
institution, but does not provide collective identity. 
Personhood, human rights and the defense of the environment are not cultural identities. They 
are values. I would like to emphasize that they are not automatically universal, per se. They are 
local, historic and relative, just as other cultural phenomena. Historically, it has not always been 
so widely accepted to condemn a massacre on account of the ethical commitment to the 
protection of the victims. Beyond the rhetoric, it is not respected everywhere in the world that 
women are equal to men. It is unthinkable in certain cultural contexts -- for example in a 
Catholic one -- that gay and lesbian couples are a form of family. 
Societies have and continue to peacefully exist and even flourish without respecting human 
rights or the environment. It is a current trend that the rights of personhood are defended as an 
open set of universal values. For example, transnational movements express their demands as 
human rights. According to the terminology sketched above, certain local values are raised to the 
status of universal by all available means, including coercive mechanisms. 
Hence, it follows that these values (human rights and personhood) are in technical conflict with 
cultural identities (citizenship, nationalities, ethnicities, religions, etc.), as much as they [cultural 
identities] are in potential conflict among themselves. This is obvious even in the most 
homogeneous country that one can imagine. Their relation is that of chronic partial overlapping 
and cultural conflict, since all, 'universal' rights of personhood and 'local' ethnicities compete 
against the others for the same resources -- namely, to monitor human behavior and provide 
meaning, as stated above in the characteristics and functions of cultural identities. 
I am aware that this pessimistic view disregards the standard narrative on everyday border 
crossing that we all do and multiculturalism reports. Furthermore, it seems to overlook the fact of 
the cultural mixing. If it puts some 'scientific minds' more at ease, I'd suggest we treat the 
statement on the latent conflict of sources of cultural identities as a legitimate hypothesis and 
think about our theoretical alternatives. 
I.2. Citizenship is linked to participation of the members in the polity of nation- states. 
According to the letter of its classic definition, citizenship is the most political of all cultural 
identities. It is originally tied to nationality and even nationalism of the French-English style4. 
Theoretically, underneath the nation-state level citizenship allows the individual to bear as many 
other identities as he or she wishes. Hence, I am tempted to say that citizenship was functionally 
not an all-encompassing identity, but a highly particular -- in the sense that it only applied to 
certain behaviors, within the boundaries of the territory. 
Because of these attributes, citizenship, alongside nationality (not nationalism), has become a 
suitable form of solidarity in ethnically-diverse societies. Today, nation-states could not accept 
other forms of cultural identity as the leading ones because of their emphasizing exclusion, 
opposition, etc. Nobody would tolerate an idea of German nationality based on Teutonic race and 
the Will to power. Even its partially blood-based criterion for granting citizenship is being 
criticized in the European Union. France prevented Algeria from becoming a Muslim state as the 
majority of the ballots intended. Consequently, it would not be out of the question to remind 
ourselves of the considerable extent to which citizenship and nationality are the current 
international standards of cultural identity in the context of the state. 
There are two processes today that have citizenship and the state as an obstacle to their growth. 
Both are inspired by the success of the category of personhood. On the one hand, cultural and 
political demands once only placed before the state are now joining the human rights agenda and 
becoming transnational affairs: political participation in the host country for legal aliens 
(remember the motto 'the right to vote is a human right'), right of immigrants to be taught in their 
native language, as claimed by Turkish parents and teachers in Stuttgart, Germany, October 
1990, cited in Soysal, 1994). This process is transnational and overrides the idea of citizenship, 
rendering it apparently useless: 'National citizenship is no longer an adequate concept upon 
which to base a perceptive narrative of membership in the postwar era' (Soysal, 1994, p. 167). 
On the other hand, there is the decades-old need for social citizenship. After civil and political 
entitlements and duties, in the XXth century jobs, housing, education and the like have become 
the number one priority rights of the citizen5. In fact, according to Soysal's analysis, this 
transformation of citizenship has already been brought by the status that guestworkers and other 
immigrants have achieved in many European countries. In other words, under certain 
circumstances, citizenship would not be distinguishing any more between members and non-
members. Rather, the notion of personhood would be dominating: '[guestworkers also] 
participate in the educational system, welfare schemes, and labor markets. They join trade 
unions, take part in politics through collective bargaining and associational activity, and 
sometimes vote in local elections' (Soysal, 1994, p. 2). Many scholars (Habermas amongst them) 
believe that the natural destination of the very notion of citizen, especially when seen from the 
perspective of the entitlements of personhood, should be a world or global citizenship. 
Turner (1994, p. 159) has also talked about the concept of cultural citizenship as synonymous 
with social citizenship, with particular emphasis on the education in the national system of 
values. In his view, not only does citizenship involve the idea of a common status and a national 
structure of politics, but it also entails 'in cultural terms the notion of a common culture' and a 
common educational system. Turner highlights that there is tension between this modern idea of 
citizenship and 'postmodern cultural complexity' and its relativism (pp. 165-166), and fears a 
coalition between postmodern culture and the idea of global human rights. He envisages a world 
of polytheistic value conflicts. 
In summary, it is important to point out that this very notion of social and cultural citizenship, as 
well as the inflation of the idea of human rights, are relatively recent processes. Both human 
rights and cultural citizenship as described by Turner differ with the original concept of 
citizenship. Human rights are non-binding values, they are far from satisfying the functional 
demands that citizenship does in the framework of nation-states. Cultural citizenship as 
described by Turner overflows citizenship, because citizenship, as a form of cultural identity, did 
not originally implied (not in the letter nor in the spirit, and should not in the future) a whole set 
of social, cultural and educational values. To produce a sentence as effective as Turner's slogan I 
would say that citizenship was traditionally monotheism, in regard to public participation in the 
legal and political community, while it implied freedom of creed elsewhere. 
I.3. However aside from conflicting with ethnic and minority groups we might depict the concept 
of citizenship, it is precisely the lack of explicit relation between these institutions -- citizenship 
and ethnic and minority groups what is becoming a problem when dealing with conflicting 
demands to the state, and political unions. 
For example, a gay community may claim that same sex marriage is an entitlement of its 
citizens, whereas the opposite claim would be made by the Christian collective. The Danish 
reaction to Maastricht Treaty in Europe was widely interpreted as a resistance to the idea of 
European citizenship. By the amendments that Danish people had the European Union include 
prior to a second referendum on Maastricht, they were defending their Danish citizenship against 
the 'uncontrolled' extension of its entitlements to citizens or legal aliens of the member states of 
the European Union. They did not want to lose the management of the boundaries of their 
citizenship and nationality. 
Both cases pose a puzzle to the future shape of citizenship and prompt it to define its relations 
with other cultural identities. The conflicts are proof that neither side has specified how to relate 
to each other. 
II 
II.1. My earlier relativization of universal values does not completely call them into question. I 
do think that a global world needs global values, and that the protection of personhood is an 
achievement of mankind. However, these values will collide with the complex web of cultural 
identities and national citizenship if they are stretched so as to include 'universal' rights such as 
providing services from the states in the language of the immigrant or local minorities, 
respecting religious holidays, and so on. In other words, they will collide with the complex web 
of cultural identities and national citizenship if they are stretched so as to include each and every 
cultural redefinition of the democratic rules of states in which those values where fostered in the 
first place. 
This paper argues that the defense of personhood as a global phenomenon has to stop at the level 
of freedom, peace, equality and justice. It would leave vernacular languages, religion, relations to 
minorities and the like to the nations, below the economic and political unions, and, by the same 
token, to the internal politics of citizenship and local government. Since many countries are 
officially laic, in a context of freedom of creed, it follows that their position is to ensure the 
freedom, not to administer the representation of all religions in the classroom. In other words, 
citizenship is a historically crafted rule of the democratic game, whereas cultural complexity is 
one of the contents of this game. If I may extend the metaphor without confusing the reader, I 
would add that rules belong to a higher logical type, are the environment of the game, but are not 
part of the act of playing the game (Wilden, 1987). 
II.2. Citizenship does not need to become culturalized in any case, beyond its traditional alliance 
with nationality. The only culture that citizenship has to foster is that of freedom, political 
participation, and the like (in entitlements and duties). Civil, political and social citizenship 
finish their task with providing equal access and opportunities to all the members of the 
community. Under my hypothesis, whenever citizenship attempts to take over other forms of 
cultural identity, it triggers a conflict perceived as a threat in identity terms. It could hardly be 
otherwise since the impossibility of universal consensus and the necessary presence of cultural 
identities are an anthropological a priori to these relations. The reverse argument applies to the 
reportedly desirable 'global citizenship', or 'citizenship of the world' that Habermas (1992) 
envisages as the true destination of the whole idea of membership. Whenever citizenship fails to 
refer to a state like system of membership, it loses its policy-making and people-binding 
potential. 
This praiseworthy and well-meaning desire (of global citizenship) disregards the other side of the 
contemporary sociological agenda -- that of the particularization, rise in ethnic nationalism and 
enaction of tradition precisely as a reaction caused by the globalization. My view is that this 
twofold tendency, rather than ending the meaning of state-related citizenship, presents the state 
with new challenges for which, to the surprise of some scholars, is one of the most suitable 
institutions we can resort to. As regards to the territorial aspect of a social and inclusive 
citizenship, my position coincides with Baubock's 'A comprehensive concept of citizenship 
which contains individual as well as collective rights, civil and political as well as social rights 
can only be institutionalized within communities bounded both territorially and in terms of 
membership' (1994, p. 19). The territoriality of every citizenship is its means to accomplish its 
goals as institutions, not a nonsensical limitation to higher aspirations. 
II.3. In addition to citizenship, I believe that Nationality 'a la Americain' is the only institution 
whose 'cultural administration' corresponds to the government. Whenever possible, it should be 
sought to shrink the cultural requirements of the nationality to a handful of clear symbols. The 
idea of social citizenship, whose management has directly to do with the Welfare State, is not to 
be confused with cultural differences or bottom-up proposals of cultural citizenship such as 
Rosaldo's (1994). What Turner calls cultural citizenship is indeed a set of regulations and values, 
highly mixed, resulting from centuries of cultural mingling. Yet it has come to equal the rules of 
democracy, and does not match any longer the wide coverage of everyday decisions that other 
cultural identities enjoy, ethnic or religious ones being notable examples. 
From the citizens' viewpoint, all citizenships are cultural. All participation in the democratic life 
of the state is shaped by their experience in their home region within the country, group, culture, 
nation, etc. There are no performances or understandings of citizenship more 'cultural' than 
others. Cultural citizenship is a privately-inspired but publicly-performed enterprise. The more 
interpretations or motivations the citizenship of a country is triggered by, the bigger the number 
of choices. Diversity improves the chances of survival and development of any society. But it 
does so as long as it remains aware of the presence of a meta-level on which the rules that allow 
its diversity have to be preserved. 
My original question has evolved and now shows a new wording. To ask about the relationship 
between cultural identities and citizenship actually means to question the relationship between 
the duet formed by nationality and citizenship (comprising also social citizenship) and all the 
other co producers of cultural identities. I insist that cultural identities exclude (or not necessarily 
include) the body of human rights. According to the aforementioned reflections, what is the 
content of such a relationship in a way that both ensures functionality and cultural diversity in 
the nation state? I wish to summarize the discussion with a brief answer that unfolds in two parts: 
NONE, from the government's viewpoint; ANY, from the citizen's perspective. 
III 
III.1. Several conclusions regarding why qualitative approaches are fitting to the study of 
citizenship can be drawn from the preceding sections. I would like to conclude with a listing of 
some of them, following their order of appearance in the paper. Afterwards a small number of 
warnings will be made, especially in regard to section II. Neither list is exhaustive. They aim to 
make clear the crucial relevance of qualitative methodology to the research of European identity 
and citizenship. 
* Culture is a local phenomenon. Therefore, the best place to access the relationship between 
culture, identity and citizenship is at their local crossroads. Citizenship is not excluded from the 
idea of culture that qualitative researchers apply. There is a need to study ethnographically how 
citizenship is interpreted, in Europe as well as in the US, with regard to other memberships and 
identities. 
* The discourses about citizenship that we will find in the field partake of a circular dynamic: 
they are locally crafted and embedded but bespeak global trends and problems. Globalization has 
created a new relevance for qualitative research in its ability to seize such local/global 
connections. 
* Qualitative research can account for the historical complexity that lies behind the 
interpretation/construction of a group or one's own identity, thus contributing to a better 
understanding of the narratives that inspire political discourses. 
* Approaches such as the one proposed in this paper assume that institutions are systems in 
permanent conflict. Qualitative research deals with conflict in terms of system dynamics and 
opportunities for change, not as hindering contradictions. As a result, these approaches have a 
comparative advantage in unstable contexts such as the present one in Europe. 
* Related to the preceding point is my proposal of the heuristic idea of tangled hierarchies as 
suitable to describe and examine the situation of the European Union. At the ethnographic level 
structures are more blurred, fluid and mixed, whereas complex relationships, structural 
contradictions, and individual strategies are transparent. Very often these relations involve 
multiple levels and changes between them in a manner that resembles what Hofstadter calls 
tangled hierarchies. In the case of European Union, where the fostering of European identity 
from above has stumbled upon a gridlock, qualitative research of bottom-up alternatives is 
desperately needed. 
* The ethnographic research of citizenship affords us an understanding of the different cognitive 
and emotional value of diverse cultural identities for individuals in the same position. We can 
learn which identities are being mobilized on what grounds and to what ends. And what is just as 
important, we learn which identities do not matter, regardless of their objective weight in 
economic terms or political transcendence. 
III.2. Having reviewed the strengths of qualitative research, there is a list of cautions that might 
be of interest to those applying qualitative research in the field of European studies: 
* Even though the emphasis on relations and tangled hierarchies is empirically justified, one 
should remain aware of the fact that structures do continue to exist amid the change. While 
qualitative research of citizenship and culture in the EU is relevant for the reasons 
aforementioned, it has to be supplemented by certain amount of "armchair anthropology". For 
example, it is not through countless interviews in Southern Spain's Sierra Morena that one learns 
the voting rules of the Commission of the European Union. And such rules do exist and make up 
a dimension of the European Union, which in turn affects everyday life in Sierra Morena. 
Sometimes the ethnographer tends to forget that there is more to reality than people's talk and 
lives, that there are contexts that span beyond individuals and point to macrostructural dynamics. 
When dealing with these issues, fieldwork is only a small window that allows us to peep, yet 
tells very little about how such contexts work or why they exist in the first place. 
* Another foe of qualitative research is to mistake individuals or groups for their discourses and 
identify them with homogeneous positions. The need to cope with a rich data can lead us to 
attach certain opinions to particular regions or entire collectives. By doing so we could 
eventually replace the map of nation states in Europe with the map of ethno-national minorities, 
and that with a classification of separatist and non separatist cultures. But it is improbable that 
such multilayer structure would deepen our understanding of their relation with European 
citizenship and one another, to say the least. 
* At times narrative reports of ethnographic data can overemphasize the power of discourse and 
culture to shape social movements or organize political action. Either by means of policy 
recommendations or by trying to cooperate with a grass-root movement, ethnographers might 
overestimate the ability of the local culture to circulate on a global scale and produce larger 
movements. This is frequently caused by the seemingly unbounded power that culture enjoys 
when studied at the local level. A reminder of the existence of a historical background of 
constraints should help to reassess the political implications of the research. 
* Besides keeping in mind the existence of structural relations that constrain individuals, it is 
useful to remember that at some level "rules are no game". Wilden, a disciple of Bateson's, has 
written extensively on the systemic distinction between these two main levels in a system. I 
myself have contended in this paper that the "game" of cultural citizenship in Europe can take 
place only under the umbrella (the rules) of democratic systems. Just as an alcoholic has to 
change the punctuation of his experience and jump onto a second level to escape his addiction, 
the ethnographer has to jump back and forth between these two "Batesonian" levels to attain a 
fruitful interpretation of the data. If he fails to do so the research will be no more than a data-
gathering exercise or a political pamphlet. 
* Last but not least, qualitative research often makes the researcher confront ethical dilemmas. 
To some extent, this is inescapable. In my paper I discussed that only some, not all values are the 
ultimate core of the rules a society lives by. In other words, not all participants can claim equal 
credit for preserving the context in which they blossom. If we were to follow the 
recommendations of the National Front in France we might very well lose the democratic system 
in which there can be National Fronts. Regardless of one's political standpoint, the qualitative 
researcher of citizenship must know that there is such a thing as a meta-level of rules of the 
system that is made up of moral values. It is made present in everyday conversations and 
sometimes its existence seems to be the problem instead of the solution. Yet no society can do 
without values, and let us not forget that relativism does not qualify as one such system of 
values. 
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Footnotes 
1. I am aware that these dynamics play very different roles in different theoretical approaches. 
For Robertson (1992), globalization -- often referred to as universalization together with 
particularization are complementary and interpenetrated. His "globalization analysis" is not to be 
confused with world-systems analysis la Wallerstein. In giving further explanation, Robertson 
argues that while in world-system theory the economic is the chief perspective, his is much more 
concerned with the interpenetration of culture and economy, therefore rendering culture and 
religion as far more than epiphenomenal. Giddens (1994) puts these two domains of 
transformation (globalization and particularization) in the perspective of the destructive effects 
of modernity upon tradition. Unlike Robertson, Giddens ventures an explanation -- the revival of 
tradition with its particularizing consequences is a reaction against the spread of modern 
institutions, largely dependent on the "radicalization" of modernity and capitalism. Modernity 
leads to a complete destruction of the local community "Thus local customs that continue to exist 
tend to develop altered meanings" (p. 101). "Processes of evacuation, the disinterring and 
problematizing of tradition" (p. 58) spring as a result of the radicalization of modernity. Giddens 
sees this side of the transformation as problematic and in danger of turning into violent (p. 105). 
2. Miller's (1994) "In Defence of Nationality" is an interesting paper in this regard. 
3. Cohen (1994) takes this widely admitted combination of identities within the individual to the 
point where it seems to disavow my hypothesis of the social conflict between identities. I remain 
far less optimistic. 
4. In this regard I disagree with Habermas (1992), for whom the connection between citizenship 
and nationalism is coincidental, a matter of timing. I think otherwise. The legal and political 
aspects of membership that citizenship conveys could not have arisen had it not been in coalition 
with the nationalism and its redefinition of the community. The same thesis is held by Marshall 
(1964) who maintains that "Citizenship's history is by definition, national" (p. 72) and 
[citizenship] requires a "direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization 
which is a common possession" (p. 92). However, I ultimately agree with Habermas' motives -- 
the downplay of the nationalistic component of every citizenship as to make it more inclusive 
and suitable for multiculturalism. 
5. As Marshall (1964, p. 72) has it, social citizenship is about "the whole range from the right to 
a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to full in the social heritage and 
to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The 
institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services". 
See also Bart van Steenbergen (1994) for an updated reminder of what he calls the big exclusion 
of the underclass: "socially marginalized, isolated, politically harmless, economically 
superfluous. They survive physically, but not socially". 
Juan M. Delgado-Moreira 
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